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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1993, twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnapped from
her home in California and murdered.1 The murderer, Richard Allen Davis,
had been twice convicted of kidnapping and was on parole at the time he
abducted and murdered Polly Klaas. 2 Proposition 184-the "Three Strikes"
law-was on the ballot at the time.3  Proposition 184 mandated life
sentences for offenders with two prior felonies who are subsequently
convicted of a third.4 The Proposition was California's response to the many
crimes perpetrated by repeat felons, like the murder of Polly Klaas.5 Voters
in California lived in fear of rising crime rates and were angered by the
penal system's revolving door: short sentences and early paroles for violent
offenders.6 Polly's murder gave a face to these fears as voters went to the
polls, and "Three Strikes" became law in California.
Though widely supported by the public and by politicians of both major
parties, many legal scholars immediately objected to the law.8 Academics
characterized the law as extreme, a result of public panic and "populist,"
"anti-offender" sentiments, and claimed that issues such as crime and
punishment should be left to criminal justice experts, not the public.9 They
raised concerns about possible life sentences for felons who had never
committed violent crimes, arguing that such sentences would be
disproportionate to their associated crimes, and thus are cruel and unusual
punishment.1° Answering these concerns in Ewing v. California, the
Supreme Court held that such sentences are not cruel and unusual
1. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14-15 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 15-16 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 2003)). Section 667(e)(2)(A)
provides that defendants previously convicted of two or more felonies (as defined in subsection (d)
of section 667) that have been pled and proved shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of life in
prison for the current felony, with a minimum term of the greater of. (i) three times the term
otherwise provided for each current felony conviction; (ii) imprisonment for twenty-five years; or
(iii) the term determined by the court pursuant to section 1170, which regards determinate
sentencing,for the underlying conviction, including any applicable enhancement, or any period
prescribed by section 190, which defines punishment for murder, or section 3046, which relates to
the minimum term for life imprisonment. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2003).
5. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15.
6. See Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of
the Case Against California's Three Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L. REv. 43, 50 (2000).
7. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15.
8. Janiskee & Erler, supra note 6, at 54-60.
9. Id. at 54-55.
10. Id. at 56. Janiskee and Erler cite to Professor Lisa Cowart, who noted that eighty percent of
those sentenced under the three strikes law are incarcerated for nonviolent crimes. Id.
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punishment, so long as they are not "grossly disproportionate.""
This note will examine the Court's decision in Ewing and discuss its
implications. Part II traces the history of the Court's decisions regarding
disproportionate sentences.' 2 Part III outlines the facts of Ewing.'3 Part IV
reports and analyzes the Court's plurality, concurring, and dissenting
opinions.' 4 Part V discusses the impact of the Court's decision. 5 And Part
VI concludes.'
6
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Roots of the Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishments. '
7
Although the exact meaning of that clause is widely disputed, its wording is
likely taken from England's 1689 Declaration of Rights. 8 Whether the
Framers of the Eighth Amendment intended to incorporate the meaning, as
well as the language, of the 1689 Declaration's cruel and unusual
punishments clause, though, is not settled. 9 Two opinions of the Court,
eighteen years apart, express disagreement on that point.2° Writing for the
majority in Solem v. Helm, Justice Powell held that the Framers intended to
incorporate at least the protections of the 1689 Declaration, and that the
Declaration barred disproportionate punishments.2' In Harmelin v.
Michigan, Justice Scalia, writing for himself and the Chief Justice, disagreed
11. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27-31.
12. See infra notes 17-91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 97-208 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 209-332 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 333-36 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIH ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
18. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-67 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia cites Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983), as concluding that the English Declaration of
Rights of 1689 is the source of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
966 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Powell's dissent in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 287 (1980),
also supports this proposition. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910), also notes this,
identifying Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution as the source of the proposition.
19. Compare Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86, with Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-76 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
20. Compare Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86, with Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-76 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
21. Solem, 463 U.S. at 286. Justice Powell cited to William Blackstone's Commentaries, holding
that the 1689 Declaration of Rights barred disproportionate sentences. Id at 285.
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with Justice Powell on both points. First, Justice Scalia noted that a direct
incorporation of the 1689 Declaration's meaning would have been
impossible because "[t]here were no common-law punishments in the
federal system.. ... ,2' The Eighth Amendment was to apply to Congress,
not the courts, and the meaning that "unusual" had to English Courts
("contrary to the law") would not make sense when applied to a body whose
will is the law.24 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, the Eighth Amendment
may have used the Declaration's language, but it did not incorporate its
25meaning. Second, Justice Scalia stated that even if the Eighth Amendment
incorporated the meaning of the 1689 Declaration, that meaning did not
include a bar of disproportionate sentences.26 He concluded that "cruel and
unusual punishment" only applied to sentences that were greater in length or
severity than allowed by law.27 Accounts of the House of Commons'
passage of the Declaration all point to illegal sentences handed down by a
certain English court as the reason for the Declaration.28 In fact, no source
contemporaneous with the Declaration held it to bar disproportionate
sentences that were allowed by law.29
Further, little legislative history exists for the Eighth Amendment.3°
Those advocating its adoption, such as eminent revolutionary Patrick Henry,
feared that without it, the U.S. Congress would do such things as use torture
to induce confessions.3' The Court, adopting those fears as the intent of the
Amendment, has held that the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment to
proscribe "barbaric" methods of punishment.32 Some decisions of the Court,
however, have interpreted the Eighth Amendment more broadly as also
barring punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the crimes
committed.33
22. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 972-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 975 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 975-76 (Scalia, J., concurring).
25. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 974 (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 973-74 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 972-73 (Scalia, J., concurring).
29. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
30. See id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 287 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he legislative history of the Eighth Amendment is not extensive").
31. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J., dissenting).
32. See id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 319-22 (1972)).
33. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
996-97) (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Eighth Amendment... contains a 'narrow
proportionality principle..."'); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Eighth
Amendment prohibit[s] 'greatly disproportioned' sentences .... ) (citations omitted); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ('The constitutional principle of proportionality has been
recognized explicitly in this Court .... "); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 271 (Powell, I., dissenting) ("[T]he
Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime."); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("Mhe Eighth Amendment bars...
punishments that are... 'excessive' in relation to the crime committed."); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("[It is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to offense.").
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B. Weems, Robinson, and Coker: The Genesis of Proportionality Review
The Court first held that the Eighth Amendment allows "proportionality
review" in Weems v. United States.34 There, the defendant was convicted of
falsifying a public record, an offense completed merely upon the knowing
entry of a single false item into a public document, even if no person was
injured by that false entry. 35  For his offense, he received an unusual
sentence known as the cadena temporal,36 a punishment from Spanish law
and entirely foreign to the American legal system.37 It typically consisted of
a twelve- to-twenty year prison sentence involving hard, painful labor while
chained at the ankle and wrist.38  Further, it included several
"accompaniments" to the main sentence: lack of assistance from friends or
relatives, no marital authority, no parental rights, no property rights, and no
participation in family council. 39 These penalties were to last through the
term of imprisonment.4° In addition, the cadena temporal included two
permanent accompaniments: registration with and surveillance by the
government, requiring the defendant to notify the government anytime he
moved; and "perpetual absolute disqualification," which was defined as
deprivation of public office, even if obtained by popular election,
deprivation of the right to vote or hold public office, loss of retirement pay,
among other denied public privileges.4' Invalidating the sentence, the Court
held that the punishment was both barbaric and disproportionate.4 2 It noted
that grossly disproportionate sentences are cruel and unusual punishment,43
34. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 286-87. The term "proportionality review" is taken from the opinions
of a number of the Court's decisions. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. Weems, 217 U.S. at 363.
36. Id. at 363-65.
37. Id. at 363-64. The cadena temporal was only before the Court because the petitioner had
been sentenced in the Philippines. See id. at 357-58. The Philippines was an American colony,
taken from its former ruler, Spain, in the Spanish-American War. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 613 (1997).
38. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364. Weems's sentence was for fifteen years. Id. at 358.
39. Id. at 364.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 377 ("[The cadena temporal's] punishments come under the condemnation of the bill
of rights, both on account of their degree and kind.").
43. See id. at 371 (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting)). In O'Neil, the defendant had been convicted of 307 counts of selling liquor without a
license, and was sentenced to a prison term of over fifty-four years. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 286 n.l 1 (1983). As construed in Solem, the majority in O'Neil did not find the sentence
unconstitutional because the defendant had not alleged it in his brief, and because the Eighth
Amendment at the time was not held to apply to the states. Id. However, Justice Field's dissent in
O'Neil touched on the Eighth Amendment question, noting that the Eighth Amendment 'is
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and that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.""4
After Weems, the Court did not reverse a sentence as disproportionate
for half-a-century.4 5 When it did, in Robinson v. California, the Court not
only found the defendant's sentence to be disproportionate, but also held that
the Eighth Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.46 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of being a
drug addict.47 The law he was convicted of violating provided that "'[n]o
person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics....,,,4 To prove violation of the law by showing addiction, the
State did not even need to prove that the defendant had used any narcotics
within the State's jurisdiction. 49  The Court reversed the conviction,
reasoning that proportionality dictates that sentences can not be considered
in the abstract, but must be considered in light of the crime, and that any
punishment for a sickness or addiction is disproportionate.5 °
The Court faced another proportionality challenge in Coker v.
Georgia.5' There, the defendant kidnapped and raped a woman during an
escape from prison after he had bound her husband and stolen the family's
car keys.52 He had previously been convicted of murder, rape, kidnapping,
and aggravated assault, and was serving his sentence for those crimes when
he escaped. 3 His penalty for this newest rape-execution-was only given
for that crime because of the presence of aggravating circumstances -
specifically the previous conviction of a capital felony and a rape committed
during a capital felony.M Finding that both aggravating circumstances were
present, the jury sentenced Coker to death.55 The Court, relying on Weems
and Robinson, held that the Eighth Amendment bars excessive
punishments.56 It stated that a punishment is excessive "if it (1) makes no
directed... against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offenses charged." Id. (quoting O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 339-40 (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
44. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
45. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 287. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), was decided in
1962, fifty-two years after Weems.
46. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. The Court in both Ewing and Solem has interpreted
Robinson's rationale that sentence length should not be considered in the abstract, but rather in
relation to the offense, as an embrace of proportionality review. See infra note 50; Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003); Solem, 463 U.S. at 287. Justice Scalia, in contrast, has noted that
Robinson was not decided on proportionality grounds. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994
n.14 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660-64.
48. Id. at 660 n.1 (quoting the CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721, which was repealed in
1972).
49. Id. at 663.
50. Id. at 667.
51. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
52. Id. at 587.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 587-91.
55. Id. at 591.
56. Id. at 592.
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measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.., or (2) is
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime," and it held that a
death sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime of rape.57
C. The Three "Landmark Cases": Rummel, Hutto, and Solem
Following Coker, the Court decided three landmark cases in quick
succession, all dealing with proportionality review of "term of year"
sentences. 58 The first of these, Rummel v. Estelle, concerned a life sentence
for a three-time felon.5 9 That felon, Rummel, was convicted of obtaining
$120.75 under false pretenses and was sentenced under Texas's recidivist
statute to life in prison with a possibility of parole after ten or twelve years.60
He had previously been convicted of credit-card fraud and check forging.61
The recidivist statute mandated life in prison for persons convicted of three
or more non-capital felonies, and Rummel was sentenced accordingly.62 The
Court there held that the life sentence was not disproportionate.63 It noted
that the gross disproportionality principle had been used most frequently in
death penalty cases, and distinguished the death penalty from other
punishments based on its finality and irrevocability. 64 It then noted that
outside of death sentences, proportionality challenges are rarely successful. 65
In the strongest language, the Court stated that one could argue without fear
of being contradicted by its decisions that sentence length is a matter of
legislative prerogative, but then backtracked by acknowledging in a footnote
that proportionality challenges to prison sentences could be successful in
extreme cases.66
57. Id.
58. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).
59. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264-68 (1980).
60. Id. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 265.
62. Id. at 266 (noting that with minor revisions, the statute was later codified as TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974)).
63. Id. at 285.
64. Id. at 272 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 274 n. 11. The meaning of this statement has been a point of much contention in the
Court's opinions following Rummel. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Harmelin, interprets
this statement as indicating that proportionality review only applies to death sentences. Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Powell, in his Solem
majority opinion, dismissed the statement because it only claims "one could argue," and focused
instead on the footnote to the statement that acknowledged that proportionality review could apply to
extreme sentences, such as life in prison for a parking ticket. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303
n.32 (1983).
The second of these cases, Hutto v. Davis, concerned the imposition of
two consecutive twenty-year sentences for possession with intent to
distribute nine ounces of marijuana and distribution of marijuana.67
Affirming the sentences, the Court restated its holding in Rummel that
"federal courts should be 'reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms
of imprisonment,' and that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare.' 68 .  It held that
comparisons of prison terms are invariably subjective and stated that there is
no clear way to make any constitutional distinction between one prison
sentence and another.69 Also, the Court noted that it had "'never found a
sentence for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by
itself, a cruel and unusual punishment.,
70
In the last of the three landmark decisions, Solem v. Helm, the Court
significantly reinterpreted Rummel." In Solem, the defendant, a repeat
offender, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
issuing a "no account" check. 2  He had been previously convicted three
times of third-degree burglary, and had also been convicted of obtaining
money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and driving under the
influence.73 He received a stiff sentence because, under South Dakota's
recidivist statute, offenders with three or more previous felonies must be
sentenced for a "Class One felony," for which the maximum punishment is
life in prison without parole.74  The Court found the sentence
disproportionate, factually distinguishing Rummel by noting that the life
sentence there was with the possibility of parole.75 Further, it implicitly
disagreed with Rummel and Hutto, holding that courts are competent to
objectively determine whether contested prison sentences are
proportionate.76 To aid in such judicial determinations, the Court formulated
three objective criteria: (1) the gravity of the offense versus the harshness of
67. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371-72 (1982) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274, 272 (1980)).
69. Id. at 373.
70. Id. at 371-72 (quoting Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1229 (4th Cir. 1978)).
71. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 964-65 (Scalia, J., concurring). While "significantly reinterpreted" is
admittedly a bit argumentative, it becomes clearly justified upon comparing the majority opinion in
Rummel to that in Solem. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Further, comparison of Salem's majority
opinion, written by Justice Powell, to Justice Powell's dissent in Rummel reveals striking similarities
between those two opinions. Compare Salem, 463 U.S. at 284-96, with Rummel, 445 U.S. at 286-95
(Powell, J., dissenting). For example, the Salem Court's objective criteria for conducting
proportionality review, mentioned in this case note and cited in footnote 77, comes almost verbatim
from Justice Powell's Rummel dissent. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting); see
infra note 77 and accompanying text.
72. Solem, 463 U.S. at281.
73. Id. at 279-80.
74. id. at 281-82 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981)).
75. Salem, 463 U.S. at 297.
76. Compare Salem, 463 U.S. at 292 ("[C]ourts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense,
at least on a relative scale."), with Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373 (1982) (quoting Rummel, 445
U.S. at 275 and stating that "the excessiveness of one prison term as compared to another is
invariably a subjective determination, there being no clear way to make 'any constitutional
distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of years"').
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the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on criminals in the same jurisdiction;
and (3) the sentence for the same crime in other jurisdictions.77
D. The Birth of the Current State of the Law: Harmelin
Several years later, the Court again faced the proportionality issue in
Harmelin v. Michigan.78  There, five Justices in two opinions concurred in
judgment to uphold a life sentence for possessing 672 grams of cocaine.79 In
Justice Scalia's opinion, he stated that proportionality review was limited to
the Court's death penalty jurisprudence, and that it did not apply to prison
sentences. 80 Justice Scalia recognized that the death penalty is subject to
proportionality review because of the unique nature of that punishment and
because stare decisis counseled him to recognize it.8' Otherwise, he argued,
the Eighth Amendment contains no gross disproportionality principle and
thus does not require proportionality review.82 According to Justice Scalia,
the Framers of the Eighth Amendment never incorporated any gross
disproportionality principle, nor intended one.83 He also recommended that
Solem not be given stare decisis because it misinterpreted precedent, and
thus misstated the law.84
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, stated in his concurrence that
proportionality review is a part of generalized Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. While he conceded that Solem should be given stare
decisis, he stated that courts need not always apply all three of its objective
77. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92. As authority for the first element, the Court cited the analyses of
Coker, Robinson, and Weems. Id. at 291. All three decisions made some sort of comparison
between the offense and the punishment. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977)
(considering the seriousness of rape and the seriousness of the death penalty); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (emphasizing that the offense had no gravity, so any penalty
would be too harsh); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 363-67 (1910) (commenting twice on
the pettiness of the offense); see Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92. As authority for its second element, the
Court cites Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81 (identifying a list of more serious crimes that were subject to
less serious penalties). Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91. And as authority for its third element, the Court
cites Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97 (reviewing how rape was punished in other states), and Weems, 217
U.S. at 380 (noting that under federal law, the same offense was only punishable by two years in
prison and a fine). Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92.
78. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
79. Id. at 961-62, 994-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 994 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 975-85 (Scalia, J., concurring); see supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
84. Id. at 965 (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. See id. at 996-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
criteria. 6 Courts must apply the first Solem factor, the threshold test,87 but
need only apply the second and third if the threshold test is met.88 Further,
Justice Kennedy found several principles in the Court's prior decisions that
should guide proportionality review: "the primacy of the legislature, the
variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of the federal system,
and the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective
factors.,89 He then noted that although the gross disproportionality principle
is part of the Eighth Amendment, there is no requirement of strict
proportionality between sentence and crime.90 Justice Kennedy considered
this a final gross disproportionality principle, and maintained that his other
four informed this one.9'
[H. FACTS
On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing was arrested for stealing three golf
clubs, valued at $399 each, from the El Segundo Golf Course pro shop in
Los Angeles County.92 He had previously been convicted of numerous
crimes, including petty theft, theft, felony grand theft auto, battery, drug
paraphernalia possession, appropriation of lost property, unlawful possession
of a firearm, trespassing, burglary, and first-degree robbery, and was on
parole at the time of his arrest.93  He was charged with and convicted of
felony grand theft, a crime consisting of illegally taking personal property in
excess of $400.' 4 As was required by the Three Strikes law, his previous
86. Id. at 996, 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. The threshold test consists of comparing the "'gravity of the offense [with] the harshness of
the penalty."' Id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91
(1983)); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
88. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The second and third factors,
respectively, are: the sentences imposed on criminals in the same jurisdiction; and the sentence for
the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92; see also supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
89. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As authority for the first
principle, the primacy of the legislature, Justice Kennedy cites several cases, including Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980) (holding that the fixing of prison sentences involves a
penological judgment that is within the province of the legislature, not the courts). Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 998-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As authority for the second principle, the variety of
legitimate penological schemes, Justice Kennedy cites several cases, including Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (holding that principles that have guided sentencing have changed with the
times). Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As authority for the third principle,
the nature of our federal system, Justice Kennedy quotes, among others, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 291 n.17 (1983) ('The inherent nature of our federal system' may result in 'a wide range of
constitutional sentences."'). Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999-1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring). And as
authority for the fourth principle, the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective
factors, Justice Kennedy cites, among others, Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-75 (holding that
proportionality review by federal courts should be informed by 'objective factors to the maximum
possible extent' and quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000-01 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18 (2003).
93. Id. at 18-19.
94. Id. at 19 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 484 (West Supp. 2002)).
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crimes were also alleged, and Ewing was sentenced to twenty-five years to
life in prison.95
After an unsuccessful appeal to the California Court of Appeals and a
denial of a petition to review by the California Supreme Court, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed the sentence.9 6
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice O'Connor's Plurality Opinion
After reviewing the facts of the case, Justice O'Connor briefly traced the
Court's decisions involving the gross disproportionality principle.97 She
concluded that Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin represented the
current state of the law, and declared that her opinion would be guided by its
analytical framework.98 Her decision to treat Justice Kennedy's Harmelin
concurrence as the controlling precedent for proportionality review was
probably the best possible representation of the Court's consensus. 99 In
Ewing, as in Harmelin, the Court was divided into essentially three blocks.
The first and largest block, consisting of four Justices, dissented in both
cases.' ° Those Justices argued that Solem should be given stare decisis, and
that proportionality review can be objectively applied to sentences. °1 This
block was far less reluctant than the other blocks to conduct proportionality
review. 0 2 The second block, adopting Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Harmelin and Justice O'Connor's opinion in Ewing, consisted of three
Justices.0 3 Those Justices stated that Solem should be given stare decisis,
95. Id. at 19-20. California's Three Strikes law requires the prosecutor to plead and prove all
prior felony convictions. Id. at 19 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(g) (West 1999)). Because of the
classification of Ewing's crime as a "wobbler,"a felony that can be reduced to a misdemeanor at the
sentencing judge's discretion, under the same penal code provision, section 17(b), the judge could
have reduced the charge and Ewing could have avoided a three strikes sentence. Id. at 19-20. But in
view of Ewing's record, the judge let Ewing's crime remain a felony. Id.
96. Id. at 20. The California Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, relied on the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Rummel in upholding Ewing's sentence. Id.
97. Id. at 20-24.
98. Id. at 23-24.
99. See generally supra Part II-D.
100. Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg dissented in Ewing. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at
32. Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall dissented in Harmelin. See Harmelin 501
U.S. at 1009, 1027.
101. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32-53; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009-29.
102. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32-53; Harnelin, 501 U.S. at 1009-29.
103. In her opinion in Ewing, Justice O'Connor was joined by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
but also expressed the opinion that it is difficult to find objective standards
to guide proportionality review."°4 Consequently, they were much more
reluctant than the dissent to conduct proportionality review.05 The third
block, endorsing Justice Scalia's concurrences in Harmelin and Ewing and
Justice Thomas's concurrence in Ewing, consisted of two Justices. 10 6 Those
Justices argued that Solem should not be afforded stare decisis and that
proportionality review of term of year sentences inherently lacks objective
standards.'0° As such, these Justices were not merely reluctant to conduct
proportionality review of prison terms; they were outright opposed to doing
so.
108
Adding the votes of these blocks, three consensuses emerged. First,
there was a seven-vote majority for following Solem under stare decisis.
Second, there was a five-vote majority that doubted the Court's ability to
objectively conduct proportionality review. And third, there was a majority
of five Justices either reluctant or altogether opposed to conducting
proportionality review. Because these consensuses match the view of
proportionality expressed in Justice Kennedy's Harmelin concurrence,'09
Justice O'Connor was correct to treat that opinion as the current state of the
law.
1. Legislative Justifications
After holding that Justice Kennedy's Harmelin concurrence was
controlling, Justice O'Connor examined the legislative reasons for and
constitutionality of the Three Strikes law, and determined that its sentences
were not per se unconstitutional. 10 She began by noting the trend toward
three strikes laws in many states.11' She observed that although such laws
are relatively new, most states have had heightened sentences for recidivists
for many years." 2 Such sentences represent a deliberate policy choice to
focus on incapacitation and deterrence rather than retribution or
rehabilitation.1 3 Though these laws may be new, Justice O'Connor held that
the first of Justice Kennedy's gross disproportionality principles, primacy of
Rehnquist. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14. In his concurrence in Harmelin, Justice Kennedy was joined
by Justices O'Connor and Souter. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996.
104. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14-31; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-1009.
105. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14-31; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996-1009.
106. Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote concurring opinions in Ewing. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31-
33. In Harmelin, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961.
107. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31-32; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961-96.
108. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31-32; Harnelin, 501 U.S. at 961-96.
109. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for a description of Justice Kennedy's view.
110. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24-28. Although Justice O'Connor did not address the
proportionality of Ewing's sentence here, she did examine the Three Strikes law generally. See id.
She found its legislative justification both compelling and analogous to other justifications for past
recidivist laws. See id.
11. Id. at 24.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 24-25.
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the legislature, requires deference to California's decision. 1 4  She further
noted that the Constitution "'does not mandate adoption of any one
penological theory,"' and that selecting the sentencing rationale is a policy
choice to be made by legislatures, not courts."'
Justice O'Connor then examined California's rationales for its three
strikes law: reducing serious and violent crime by segregating from society
those who are unable to conform their conduct to its laws, and deterring
other repeat felons.1 16  She held that "nothing in the Eighth Amendment
prohibits California from making [such a] choice, ' and discussed at length
the reasonableness of three strikes sentences, citing many crime and
recidivist statistics.1 8 While some may disagree with California's choice,
Justice O'Connor held, it is not the Court's role to sit as a "superlegislature"
that second-guesses state policy decisions.1 9
2. The Threshold Test
120
After considering the legislative justifications for Ewing's sentence,
Justice O'Connor addressed whether Ewing's punishment was
unconstitutionally disproportionate. 
1 2 1
First, she examined the effect of the "wobbler" status of Ewing's crime
on proportionality analysis.122  Its classification as a "wobbler" merely
allowed the judge discretion to reduce it from a felony to a misdemeanor. 123
Because the crime was a presumptive felony, and the judge acted within her
discretion, Justice O'Connor held the "wobbler" classification to be
irrelevant. 124
114. Id. at 24-25.
115. Id. at 25-28 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
116. Id. at 26-27.
117. Id. at 25-27. To show that nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from
making the choice it did, O'Connor cited several cases. Id. at 25 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S.
20, 27 (1992) ("States have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals."), and
(quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962) ("[Tjhe constitutionality of the practice of
inflicting severer criminal penalties upon habitual offenders is no longer open to serious
challenge.")).
118. Id. at 26-27. Though these statistics are certainly compelling, it is not clear that they are a
basis for the constitutionality of a sentence or of a law's sentences, and, therefore, it is not clear what
relevance they have.
119. Id. at 27-28.
120. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
121. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28-31.
122. Id. at 28-29.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 29.
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Her decision to treat the "wobbler" classification as immaterial was
sharply criticized by Justice Breyer in his dissent. 25 Justice Breyer argued
that allowing "wobblers" to act as triggering offenses for the Three Strikes
law will cause anomalies. 126  To illustrate this point he contrasted two
offenders, one who committed a "wobbler" as his first offense, and another
who committed it as his third. 27 The other crimes committed by both were
non-"wobbler" felonies. 128 The offender who committed the "wobbler" as
his first offense had the offense classified as a misdemeanor, because it was
his first offense. 129 Thus, on his third crime, he has only committed two
felonies, and will not receive a three strikes sentence. 30 The other offender
will likely have his "wobbler" treated as a felony because it is his third
crime, and thus will receive a three strikes sentence.' The anomaly
between these two is apparent. 32  They have committed the same crimes,
but only one of them receives a three strikes sentence. 133  Thus, argued
Justice Breyer, the "wobbler" status of the crime should have import in
conducting proportionality review, since the arbitrariness of such anomalies
is undesirable and points to the less-than-serious nature of Ewing's
offense. 134 Justice O'Connor did not address these arguments.
135
Next, Justice O'Connor applied Justice Kennedy's threshold test,
comparing the gravity of the offense with the harshness of the penalty.
36
She held that in weighing the gravity of the offense, the Court must consider
"not only [Ewing's] current felony, but also his long history of felony
recidivism."'' 37  Any other approach would not properly recognize the
primacy of the legislature in its choice to enact the Three Strikes law.
38
Again, she noted the reasonableness of the justification for Ewing's sentence
and held that the legislature is entitled to deference in its decision to
sentence recidivists to life in prison. 139 Thus, because Ewing's crime and
criminal history were serious, and because his sentence was legitimate, she
held that Ewing's sentence was not a rare case that met the threshold test. 4°
125. Id. at 48-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 28-29.
136. Id. at 28-31. As mentioned above, see supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text for an
explanation of Justice O'Connor's holding that Justice Kennedy's Harmelin concurrence represents
the state of the law is sound. Even Justice Breyer in his dissent uses that concurrence and its
threshold test to argue that Ewing's sentence is disproportionate, although he states that he is only
using it for "present purposes." Id. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 29.
138. Id.
139. ld. at 29-30.
140. Id. Because the threshold test was not met, Justice O'Connor did not reach Solem's
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B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
While concurring in judgment, Justice Scalia reiterated his opinion from
Harmelin: The cruel and unusual punishments clause was only meant to
exclude certain modes of punishment, like torture, and "was not a 'guarantee
against disproportionate sentences."' 1 4 1 Because Justice Scalia restated his
holding from Harmelin, some discussion of his concurrence in that case is
warranted. As mentioned above, Justice Scalia made a strong argument that
the Eighth Amendment was not intended to require proportionality review
when it was enacted. 42  Although that analysis shows strong command of
historical facts, the Justice is less than persuasive in his discussion of
Weems.' 43 He claimed that Weems did not create proportionality review and
cannot be applied because of its peculiar facts.' 44 While he admitted the
ambiguity of Weems, and took his interpretation of it directly from Rummel,
he did not explain statements in Weems that seem to establish proportionality
review.14 ' His best argument was that the Court did not conduct
proportionality review again for many years afterward. 46 Also, while he did
not wish to give Solem stare decisis, he was willing to give stare decisis to
Coker.147 But he claimed that prior to Coker, the Court did not ever really
comparative analysis. See id. In Harmelin, Justice Kennedy had concluded that the comparative
analysis was only mandated if the threshold test was met. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996,
1004-05 (199 1) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
Also, a final criticism of Justice O'Connor's opinion is that she makes no effort to rebut the
contentions of Justice Scalia, see infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text, or Justice Breyer's
application of the threshold test, see infra notes 169-211 and accompanying text.
141. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
142. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-76 (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra notes 18-29, 83, and
accompanying text.
143. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 990-92 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that the departure
of the proportionality requirement in the Eighth Amendment has not departed to the extent that
Solem suggests. Id. at 990 (Scalia, J., concurring). He further acknowledged the opinion's language
as providing support for not only the Eighth Amendment's bar on excessive punishment, but for the
bar on unique punishment as well. Id. at 992. (Scalia, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 991-92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
145. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Statements that seem to establish proportionality review in
Weems are: .'Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who.., believe that it is precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportional to offense,"' id. at 991
(quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-67); and .'[T]he inhibition [of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause] was directed, not only against punishments which inflict torture, 'but against all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offense
charged."' Id. (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 371 (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting))).
146. Id. at 991-92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 994 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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recognize proportionality review.1 48 Why Coker should be allowed to defy
precedent and Solem should not is only explained by restating the "death is
different" doctrine. 49 Other than that, he gave no explanation. It seems
inconsistent, however, to overrule Solem without also overruling Coker and
other decisions that rely on a constitutional protection that Justice Scalia
himself argued was never enacted by the Framers.
Justice Scalia then went on to contend that proportionality is a concept
inherently "tied to the penological goal of retribution" and is irrelevant to the
analysis when the goal of the Three Strikes law is incapacitation. 50 Justice
Scalia makes a good point here. If the Eighth Amendment contains a
proportionality protection, then the Court is required to view punishment as
a function of offense. Such a protection would logically mandate that
legislatures make retribution an express penological goal, or at least consider
whether their sentences would be considered grossly disproportionate in
light of that goal. This would naturally conflict with the Court's repeated
holdings that the Constitution does not mandate any penological scheme.''
Thus, if states are free to pursue penological goals that do not include
retribution, a guarantee against gross disproportionality does not make
sense. 152
C. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas stated his belief that the Eighth Amendment contained
no gross disproportionality principle and agreed with Justice Scalia that
Solem should not be given stare decisis.153 He gave no justification, though,
for his views. '54 Also, in stating that he believed the Eighth Amendment
contains no gross disproportionality principle, he possibly indicated that he
even views Coker and death penalty application of proportionality review as
illegitimate. 5 5 However, because he provided no further explanation, the
extent of the Justice's view is unknown.
D. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens's dissent criticized the concurring opinions, stating that
proportionality review is "capable of judicial application [and is] required by
the Eighth Amendment."'' 56
148. Id. at 992-93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 994 (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 25.
152. Id. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia notes in Harmelin that "it becomes
difficult even to speak intelligently of 'proportionality,' once deterrence and rehabilitation are given
significant weight. Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept .. " Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
989 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
154. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
155. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 32-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1. Proportionality Review Is Required
To show that proportionality review is required, Justice Stevens listed
decisions requiring proportionality for fines, prison sentences, and death
sentences, and noted that it would be anomalous to require such review for
fines, but not for prison terms.'57 Seeking to avoid this apparent anomaly, he
concluded that the Eighth Amendment broadly prohibits excessive
sanctions. 158
His argument, however, must fail. The Eighth Amendment explicitly
prohibits "excessive," thus disproportionate, fines. 159 It makes no similar
use of the word "excessive" for punishments. 60 Instead, it bars "cruel and
unusual" punishments.' 6' Thus, because the Constitution treats fines and
punishments differently, it is not at all anomalous that proportionality review
would be required for the one and not the other.' 62 In fact, had the Founding
Fathers intended the Eighth Amendment to bar disproportionate
punishments, they certainly knew how to state it specifically. 163 Eight years
before the ratification of the Eighth Amendment, New Hampshire adopted
two separate provisions in its constitution, one barring "cruel or unusual
punishments," the other stating that "all penalties ought to be proportioned
to the nature of the offense."'164 As Justice Scalia argued in his Harmelin
concurrence, "to use the phrase 'cruel and unusual punishment' to describe a
requirement of proportionality would have been an exceedingly vague and
oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to saying
more directly.'
' 65
157. Id. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens cited United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321 (1998), as prohibiting disproportionate or excessive fines; Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), as
prohibiting disproportionate or excessive bail; and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), as
prohibiting death sentences when they are disproportionate to the coordinate crimes. Ewing, 538
U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that
Solem wrongly assumed that "proportionality" and "cruel and unusual" mean the same thing).
163. Id. at 977 (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. Id. 977-78 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, arts. XVIII, XXXIII (1784)
(internal citations omitted)).
165. Id. at 977 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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2. Ability of the Judiciary to Conduct Proportionality Review
Next, Justice Stevens argued that judges are called on to draw lines in
many contexts and to exercise their judgment to give meaning to the
Constitution's protections. 66 He observed that judges have historically been
given a large amount of discretion in sentencing criminals. 167 In using that
discretion, judges commonly applied the gross disproportionality
principle. 68 Thus, judges have been and will continue to be able to draw
lines between proportionate and disproportionate sentences. 1
69
E. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer dissented from the Court's judgment and held that
Ewing's sentence was grossly disproportionate. 170 To demonstrate this, he
claimed to use the plurality's analytical framework to show that even under
their interpretation of the law, Ewing's sentence was disproportionate. 17'
Although Justice Breyer maintained that he was applying Justice
Kennedy's analytical framework, he did not discuss Ewing's sentence in
terms of the four gross disproportionality principles. 72 He did not mention
how the Court's practice of deference to the legislature should affect the
outcome of his proportionality review; nor did he review the sentence in
terms of the nature of the American federal system.1 73  In fact, in his
comparative analysis, he noted that Ewing's sentence would only be possible
in nine other states, implying that sentences in those states are dubious
merely because forty other states disagree with them, an implication clearly
at odds with the setup of our federal system. 174 While he claimed to use
objective factors in applying the threshold test,175 he did not acknowledge
the limits of the Court's ability to find such objective factors, nor did he
show any reluctance in reviewing Ewing's sentence due to the lack of
objective factors. 176 Also, while he acknowledged the variety of penological
choices California could make, 177 he showed no deference to its actual
choice.178  Thus, Justice Breyer's claim that he was applying Justice
Kennedy's analytical framework is dubious, at best.
166. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 33 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 34-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 35 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 36-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 35-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 42-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 37-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 37-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 50-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 30 n.2 (disagreeing with Justice Breyer's statement that Ewing's sentence cannot be
justified on "property-crime-related incapacitation grounds" and holding that California is not so
limited in its application of its chosen penological scheme).
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1. The Threshold Test
Justice Breyer began by comparing the harshness of Ewing's
punishment to the gravity of his offense. 7 9 Rather than using the four
proportionality principles for the threshold test, as Justice Kennedy's
Harmelin opinion called for, he contrasted the facts of Ewing with Rummel
and Solem, and found that Ewing's claim falls between those cases. 80 He
asserted that what distinguishes Rummel from Solem is the length of the
sentence. 181 While he also noted that the sentence-triggering behavior and
the offender's criminal history are objective factors to be considered, he
argued that those factors are substantially similar in Rummel, Solem, and
Ewing, and thus it is the other factor, length of the sentence, that is the
determining objective factor. 182 The proportionate sentence in Rummel was
for life with the possibility of parole after ten or twelve years, while the
disproportionate sentence in Solem was for life without parole. 183 Ewing's
sentence for twenty-five years to life fell between these, but since Ewing
was thirty-eight years old, twenty-five years may be the remaining span of
his life." 4 Therefore, Justice Breyer held, Ewing's sentence was closer to
Solem. 1
85
Analytically speaking, Justice Breyer's age-based proportionality
comparison relies on prophetic ability that the Court lacks, or at least has yet
to demonstrate. It could well have been that ten years was the remainder of
the defendant's life in Rummel, and that Ewing could live and be productive
for fifty more years. Further, the assumption that the closeness of a fixed
term of years to a sentence of life in prison determines the constitutionality
of a sentence is riddled with problems. It creates a system of proportionality
review dependant on the age of the defendant.1 86 For example, if Ewing had
been fifty-five, and the sentence he received would have been exactly the
same as that in Rummel, the logic of the Justice's comparison would still
hold that the sentence is closer to Solem than Rummel, because it would
consume the remainder of the offender's life.1 87  Further, if Ewing were
twenty, his sentence would be arguably constitutional and closer to Rummel
179. Id. at 37-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 37-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. id. at 39-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 38-39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 39-40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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because he might not be likely to serve the remainder of his life. Thus, this
system of comparison creates a degree of arbitrariness based on age and is
hardly the sort of "objective factor" that proportionality analysis ought to
hinge on.
Also, while Justice Breyer claimed that Ewing's sentence is closer to
Solem, he argued that merely being between Rummel and Solem creates a
substantial argument for unconstitutionality.18 8 This argument has the effect
of transforming Rummel into a sort of outer limit of what is allowed,
something the Court has never actually held.
In a last effort to meet the threshold test, Justice Breyer also noted that
Ewing's punishment is among the most serious available, and that his
conduct is among the least serious crimes.1 89 Thus, he concluded, Ewing's
sentence meets the disproportionality threshold. 190
2. Comparative Analysis
Finding the threshold met, Justice Breyer looked at how other
jurisdictions punish the same conduct, and at what other crimes California
punishes with life in prison.' 9' He noted that prior to the enactment of the
Three Strikes law, no one in California would have served more than ten
years for Ewing's offense, and that in thirty-three other states, it would be
legally impossible for Ewing to serve more than ten years. 92 Only in nine
other states would it be possible for Ewing to receive the same sentence.
93
Further, California usually reserves Ewing's sentence for very serious,
violent crimes, such as first-degree murder. 94  Thus, Justice Breyer
concluded that both of these comparisons validate the threshold test and lead
to the conclusion that Ewing's sentence is disproportionate. 95
Justice Breyer's comparative analysis is problematic for several reasons.
First, comparison between states inherently conflicts with the nature of the
federal system, the third of Justice Kennedy's proportionality principles.
96
Though Justice Kennedy did not acknowledge it in his Harmelin
concurrence, 197 Justice Scalia convincingly demonstrated the problem in his
188. Id. at 40-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting). After holding that Ewing's crime was not serious and that
his punishment was, Justice Breyer made a last "objective" comparison to U.S. sentencing
guidelines. Id. at 41-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The very consideration of these seems at odds with
the gross disproportionality principles of acknowledging the nature of the federal system and of
giving deference to the legislature. Justice Breyer cited no constitutional requirement that sentences
be similar to these guidelines. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Why these guidelines are relevant as
an objective factor, then, is not explained. Id.
191. Id. at 42-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 43-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN §§ 484, 489 (West 1970)).
193. Id. at 46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 44-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989-90 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 996-1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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concurrence.'98 Justice Scalia noted that in some states a particular act is a
crime; while in others it is not, leading to disparities in punishment. 199 He
further noted that some state must, by the nature of the federal system, be the
harshest in its punishment. 200 Thus, unless a requirement of uniformity is
imposed that is antithetical to the nature of the federal system, sentences will
vary. 20 1 All this comparison does, then, is call into doubt the harshest state's
penal scheme, in effect forcing states to adopt identical sentences if they
wish to avoid having their sentences declared unconstitutional.
Second, Justice Breyer's comparison to California's sentencing scheme
before the Three Strikes law strongly conflicts with the idea of legislative
deference. Public anger at the previous sentences was among the very
reasons for the law.2°2
Third, the Justice's contention that property-related crimes are being
punished the same as murder is only problematic if retribution is the
penological goal.203 A state may have a strong interest in incapacitating
repeat offenders, no matter what crimes they commit for their triggering
offenses.2°  Since the only two ways of permanently incapacitating an
offender are death and life in prison, some crimes of lesser gravity must
necessarily be punished the same as crimes of higher gravity. Such a
scheme naturally conflicts with the goal of retribution, which punishes
offenses differently based on their gravity.2°5 Thus, a scheme of permanent
incapacitation for repeat serious offenders guarantees comparatively
"disproportionate" sentences. But yet, the Court maintained, nothing in the
Constitution prevents the legislature from adopting such a scheme.20 6
Therefore, requiring such a comparison violates the right of states to choose
the penological schemes they wish.
3. Overriding Legislative Justifications
Lastly, Justice Breyer considered whether California might have any
special criminal justice concerns that would justify Ewing's sentence despite
198. Id. at 989-90 (Scalia, J., concurring).
199. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
200. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
201. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
202. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 n.1 (2003).
203. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989 (Scalia, J., concurring).
204. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-27.
205. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25.
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its disproportionality.2 °7 He concluded that there are no such concerns, save
administrative ones.2 °8  These administrative concerns come from
California's need to draw some sort of workable line for offenses that will
trigger the Three Strikes law. 20 9  Justice Breyer concluded that the line
selected, between felonies and misdemeanors, can cause sentencing
anomalies. 210  For example, in some cases, if an offender's least serious
crime is committed first, it will be considered a misdemeanor and the Three
Strikes law will not apply."' But if the same offense is instead the last, the
law will apply.212 Justice Breyer then argued that the state could easily list
triggering offenses instead, avoiding the anomalies without great
administrative difficulty.213 Listing every triggering offense, however,
would not necessarily have avoided the anomalies mentioned. The
legislature could well have listed every single felony, including those treated
as "wobblers," as a triggering offense. Had it done so, the continued
classification of some of those crimes as "wobblers" would give rise to the
same anomalies mentioned.
Finally, citing several California Penal Code provisions defining serious
and violent crimes, the targets of the Three Strikes law, 1 Justice Breyer
concludes that Ewing's sentence is not justified because his crime does not
fall within this definition.215
207. Id. at 47-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The first of the anomalies Breyer mentions consists of
variations in the seriousness of the triggering behavior, ranging from assault with a deadly weapon to
stealing chicken, nuts, or avocados worth more than $100.00. Id. at 49-50 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 245 (West Supp. 2002), 487(b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 2003)). The second
concerns the offender's criminal record. Id. at 50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Under California's "petty
theft with a prior statute," petty theft is classified as a felony only if the offender has previously
committed a theft-related offense. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West
Supp. 2002)). Thus, an offender with two prior violent, non-theft felonies who commits petty theft
will not receive a three strikes sentence, but an offender with one prior violent, non-theft felony and
one prior petty theft who commits another petty theft will receive a three strikes sentence. Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
211. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying
text.
212. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 50 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying
text.
213. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
214. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ardiaz, California's Three Strikes Law: History,
Expectations, Consequences, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2000)).
215. Id. at 51-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The definitions of serious and violent crimes to which
Justice Breyer cites "include crimes against the person, crimes that create danger of physical harm,
and drug crimes." Id. at 51 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN § 667.5(c)(1) (West Supp. 2002), §
1192.7(c)(1) (West Supp. 2003), § 667.5(c)(21) (West Supp. 2002), § 1192.7(c)(18) (West Supp.
2003), and § 1192.7(c)(24) (West Supp. 2003)).
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V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Proportionality Review After Ewing v. California
1. Lockyer v. Andrade
In Lockyer v. Andrade, a companion case to Ewing decided on the same
day, the Court reversed a Ninth Circuit holding that the habeas petitioner,
Andrade, had received an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence under
California's three strikes law.2 16  Andrade had been found guilty of
committing two petty thefts with a prior conviction, and for those crimes
Andrade received two three strikes sentences.217 In Andrade's initial appeal,
the California Court of Appeal rejected his claim of disproportionality.218
The court based its decision on Justice Kennedy's Harmelin principles, and
held that Andrade's case was highly similar to Rummel v. Estelle.21 9 The
Ninth Circuit, hearing Andrade's subsequent habeas appeal, held that the
California Court of Appeal had committed clear error in its interpretation of
the gross disproportionality principle.22 °
Dividing into the same five-to-four split as in Ewing, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit.221 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
claimed that the Court's gross disproportionality jurisprudence is so
confused as to make clear error on the part of the California Court of Appeal
almost impossible.22 2 The majority held that there are only two clearly
established principles of federal law regarding sentence proportionality: first,
there is a gross disproportionality principle; and second, the "gross
disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the
216. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003).
217. Id. at 68. Guided by California law, the jury found that the two petty thefts with a prior
conviction equated to three counts of first-degree residential burglary. Id. Since first-degree
residential burglary is considered a violent felony under the Three Strikes law, "the judge sentenced
Andrade to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison." Id.
218. Id. at 68-69.
219. Id. The California Court of Appeals compared Andrade's crimes with those of the defendant
in Rummel v. Estelle. Id. at 69. Based on this evaluation, the court held that the sentence imposed
on Andrade was neither disproportionate nor cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
220. Id. at 69-70. The Ninth Circuit's decision was based on the California Court of Appeals's
disregard of Solem v. Helm. Id. at 70. By not comparing the facts of Andrade's case to the facts of
Solem, the Ninth Circuit held that the California Court of Appeals incorrectly applied constitutional
law. Id.
221. Id. at 77.
222. See id. at 72.
213
extraordinary case., 223  Justice O'Connor and the majority found that the
California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply either of these
principles, and thus reversed the Ninth Circuit.
22 4
Subsequent courts have applied Ewing in tandem with Lockyer.225
While holding Justice Kennedy's Harmelin principles to be the state of the
law for proportionality review, courts often merely take those principles to
mean nothing more than Lockyer's "extraordinary case" test. 226  Showing
how several Federal and State courts have applied Ewing and Lockyer is
illustrative of Ewing's legal impact.
2. Federal and State Cases After Ewing
Several of the Circuit Courts of Appeals have confronted proportionality
challenges after Ewing.227 In the Fifth Circuit case of Austin v. Johnson,228
the court reversed a district court opinion striking down a sentence as
grossly disproportionate. 229 The case concerned the sentence of a minor to
223. Id. at 73, 77.
224. Id. at 77. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Terhune, No. 01-56450, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26352, at *3 (9th Cir.
Dec. 23, 2003); State v. Clifton, 580 S.E.2d 40, 43-45 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003).
226. See, e.g., Gonzales, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26352, at *3; Clifton, 580 S.E.2d at 43-45.
227. See Bryant v. Adams, No. 01-55835, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25652, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 17,
2003) (holding that a three strikes sentence of twenty-five years to life for petty theft with a prior
was not grossly disproportionate); Quinones v. Garcia, No. 02-15825, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
25403, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2003) (finding that the imposition of three three strikes sentences for
two narcotics and one firearm offense, each of which could have served as the triggering offense,
was not grossly disproportionate); Butler v. Hernandez, No. 02-56683, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
25353, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 2003) (holding that a three strikes sentence of twenty-five years to
life for petty theft with a prior was not grossly disproportionate); Duenas v. Galaza, No. 00-57032,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24824, at * 1 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2003) (holding that the imposition of a three
strikes sentence was not grossly disproportionate); United States v. Olan-Navarro, 350 F.3d 551 (6th
Cir. 2003) (finding that a fifty-seven month sentence for illegally reentering the United States was
not grossly disproportionate); Anderson v. Lamarque, No. 02-57150, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23615,
at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2003) (finding that a three strikes sentence of twenty-five years to life for
petty theft with a prior was not grossly disproportionate); Garcia v. Moore, No. 02-35233, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23370, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2003) (finding that a sentence to life in prison under
Washington's recidivist statute was not grossly disproportionate); Brown v. Lamarque, No. 02-
56196, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23156, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2003) (holding that a three strikes
sentence of twenty-six years to life was not grossly disproportionate); Clark v. Lamarque, No. 02-
16955, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23154, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2003) (finding that a three strikes
sentence of twenty-six years to life for indecent exposure was not grossly disproportionate); Reed v.
Roe, No. 00-56398, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 22756, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2003) (finding that a three
strikes sentence given to a recidivist whose past crimes include robbery and assault with intent to
commit rape was not grossly disproportionate); Prince v. Adams, No. 02-15578, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22547, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 2003) (holding that a three strikes sentence of twenty-six
years to life for statutory rape was not grossly disproportionate); United States v. Bautista-
Villanueva, No. 02-3976, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12691, at *1 (8th Cir. June 23, 2003) (holding that
seventy months imprisonment for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was not grossly
disproportionate); United States v. Lopez, No. 02-4018, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12285, at *1 (8th
Cir. June 18, 2003) (finding that seventy months imprisonment for possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute was not grossly disproportionate).
228. 328 F.3d 204, 209-10 (5th Cir. 2003).
229. Id.
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boot camp for taking candy from his high school concession stand.23° The
plaintiff-minor contended that, among other things, the sentence was
disproportionate and violated his Eighth Amendment rights.23' Disagreeing
with the plaintiff and district court, the Fifth Circuit held that under Ewing,
the sentence was constitutionally permissible.232 It cited Justice Kennedy's
Harmelin principles, reiterated in Ewing, as the controlling law as to whether
a sentence is grossly disproportionate.233 Contrasting the plaintiff s sentence
to Ewing's, the court found it impossible to declare the plaintiffs
comparatively short sentence unconstitutional, reasoning that if a sentence
such as Ewing's was constitutional, the plaintiffs sentence here must alsobe. 234
The Sixth Circuit, in the case of Galloway v. Howes,235 also found that
Ewing represented the state of the law for proportionality review.236 In
Galloway, the habeas petitioner had been found to be a "fourth-felony
habitual offender," with three armed robberies as prior crimes.237 The Sixth
Circuit cited Ewing for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment contains
a narrow proportionality principle, but found that the petitioner's sentence
was not grossly disproportionate.238 In defense of its conclusion, it cited
Ewing as affording states deference in their choices of penological schemes,
and held that the state here had a legitimate interest in giving the petitioner a
long sentence. 9
In addition to the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has also
confronted proportionality challenges. In Gonzales v. Terhune, the habeas
petitioner alleged that his California three strikes sentence for the crime of
residential burglary was unconstitutional. 240 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
contention, noting that the argument had recently failed to carry the day in
Ewing.4 It interpreted Ewing as holding that California's Three Strikes law
does not "run afoul" of the Eighth Amendment, and that the petitioner's
230. Id. at 206.
231. Id. at 207.
232. Id. at 209-10.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. No. 02-1661, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16575, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2003).
236. Id.
237. Id. at *2.
238. Id. at*3-5.
239. Id. at *5.
240. Gonzales v. Terhune, No. 01-56450, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26352, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 23,
2003).
241. Id. at*3.
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habeas action was thus foreclosed.242
Many state courts have also confronted proportionality challenges since
the Ewing decision.243 While all hold Ewing to be the state of the law, there
seems to be considerable confusion in how broad or narrow its gross
disproportionality principle is when applied.244  For example, in State v.
Davis, 245 the Arizona Supreme Court struck down a recidivist's sentence to
life in prison for statutory rape as grossly disproportionate.246 Both the
majority and the dissent in that case held that Ewing provided the applicable
standard-Justice Kennedy's Harmelin principles-and both concluded that
"applying the Harmelin principles allows [them] to consider the facts of the
crime involved. ' 247  But at that point the dissent departed from the
24
majority. 48 The majority hinged its decision in large part on the consensual
nature of the sexual activity. 249 The dissent held that victim consent was not
an objective factor, as required by Ewing, and accused the majority of
applying Solem rather than Ewing in selecting which facts to analyze.25 °
The Delaware Supreme Court departed even further from the sort of
analysis called for by Ewing. t  In Crosby v. State, the court struck down a
252 Cob a etne
defendant's sentence as grossly disproportionate. Crosby was sentenced
to life in prison under the Delaware recidivist statute for his fourth
nonviolent felony.253 While the court stated its deference to Ewing by
holding it to be the state of the law, it proceeded to act as if Justice Breyer's
242. id. at *4.
243. For additional decisions, see State v. Higgins, 826 A.2d 1126 (Conn. 2003) (holding that a
sentence of life without parole for the killing of a thirteen-year-old boy was not grossly
disproportionate); Van Dyke v. State, 70 P.3d 1217 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a sentence of
fifty-five months for the defendant's attempted rape of his granddaughter was not grossly
disproportionate); State v. Hurbenca, 669 N.W.2d 668 (Neb. 2003) (holding that a sentence of ten
years in prison under Nebraska's recidivist statute for attempted prison escape was not grossly
disproportionate); People v. Lopez, 759 N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (finding a sentence of
seventeen years to life under New York's habitual offender statute was not grossly disproportionate);
State v. Dammons, 583 S.E.2d 606 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a sentence for two consecutive
terms of 95 to 123 months in prison under North Carolina's recidivist statute for failure to appear,
financial identity fraud, and habitual felon status was not grossly disproportionate); State v. Clifton,
580 S.E.2d 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a sentence of 168 to 211 months in prison under
North Carolina's recidivist statute for obtaining property under false pretenses was not grossly
disproportionate); State v. Guthmiller, 667 N.W.2d 295 (S.D. 2003) (holding that a sentence of life
in prison without the possibility of parole under South Dakota's three strikes law for criminal
pedophilia was not grossly disproportionate); Daniel v. State, 78 P.3d 205 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that
the imposition of two consecutive life sentences without possibility of parole under Wyoming's
habitual criminal statute for two counts of first-degree sexual assault was not grossly
disproportionate).
244. See infra notes 242-57 and accompanying text.
245. 79 P.3d 64, 78 (Ariz. 2003).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 78-79 (McGregor, V.C.J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 79 (McGregor, V.C.J., dissenting).
249. Id. (McGregor, V.C.J., dissenting).
250. Id. (McGregor, V.C.J., dissenting).
251. Compare Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003), with Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003).
252. Crosby, 824 A.2d at 912.
253. Id. at 897.
216
[Vol. 32: 191, 2004] Ewing v. California
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
dissent, not the majority, had carried the day.254 The court showed entirely
no deference to its own legislature, criticizing it for allowing nonviolent
felonies to merit life sentences,25 mimicking Justice Breyer's criticism of
California's Three Strikes law. 6 Going even further than Justice Breyer,
the court severely criticized the trial judge for "giving up" on Crosby,
apparently finding incapacitation, the act of society giving up on a criminal,
to be constitutionally suspect, despite Ewing's holding to the contrary.257
Relying on the Ewing dissent's rationale, the court found that Crosby's
sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate.
In a decision entirely opposite from Crosby, the Mississippi Court of
Appeals upheld a life sentence without parole under Mississippi's recidivist
statute for uttering a forged check.258 Despite the stunning similarity of the
facts there to those in Solem, where the sentence was struck down as
disproportionate, the court in Miles v. State had no problem in upholding the
259sentence.  In a tersely analyzed opinion, it concluded that Ewing allows
for deference to be given to the legislature's penological choices, and that in
this case, the Mississippi legislature's penological scheme was justified by
public safety concerns. 260  Thus a sentence determined under it, such as
Miles's, was not disproportionate.261
3. Conclusions About the State of the Law
As the above cases show, the Court's decision in Ewing has been
interpreted as making two important clarifications to its proportionality
review jurisprudence. First, the Eighth Amendment allows proportionality
review of term of year sentences.262 Both in Ewing and in Harmelin, seven
Justices agreed that Solem and its affirmation of proportionality review
should be given stare decisis. 263 While Justice Scalia argued against giving
254. See id. at 908-09.
255. See id. at 907.
256. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 48-51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
257. Crosby, 824 A.2d at 907-08; Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20.
258. Miles v. State, 864 So. 2d 963, 969 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
259. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983), with Miles, 864 So. 2d at 964.
260. Miles, 864 So. 2d at 969.
261. See id.
262. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20.
263. See id. at 23-24 (implicitly holding that Solem should be given stare decisis by stating the
Court would be guided by Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin); id. at 33 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Harmelin,
501 U.S. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting). In Harnelin, Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter all authored or joined opinions giving stare decisis to Solem. See
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Solem stare decisis in both of these cases, each time only one other Justice
agreed with him.2 4
Second, the Court is reluctant to throw out prison sentences on
proportionality grounds.265 As Justice Kennedy concluded in his Harmelin
concurrence, the Court's traditional deference to legislative decisions and its
relative lack of objective standards to distinguish between prison sentences
will result in successful challenges to term of year sentences being
exceedingly rare. 66 Three Justices agreed with this conclusion in Harmelin
and Ewing, and two held that proportionality review of prison sentences is so
subjective that it should never be done.267 Thus, there is a majority
consensus that is very reluctant to throw out prison sentences.268
These two clarifications lead to one final important conclusion: Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Ewing and Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Harnelin represent the current state of the law for proportionality
review of term of year sentences.2 69 Those opinions express the holdings of
the majority of the Court on the two above points.2 70 The Court adheres to
Solem, but is reluctant to throw out term of year sentences. 27' Because
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy represent the consensus of the Court on
Harmnelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 1027
(Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Ewing, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer all authored or joined opinions
giving stare decisis to Solem. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14; id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 35
(Breyer, J. dissenting). Thus, in both cases, seven justices favored giving Solem stare decisis.
264. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). In Harmelin, Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 961 (Scalia,
J., concurring). In Ewing, Justice Scalia was not joined by Justice Thomas, but Justice Thomas
authored a concurrence agreeing with Justice Scalia on that holding. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
265. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-31 (holding "Ewing's is not 'the rare case in which a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality') (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). In holding
that successful proportionality challenges are rare, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy thus express the
Court's reluctance to throw out sentences for proportionality reasons. Id.
266. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) ("[G]ross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for
only the extraordinary case.").
267. In Ewing, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that
successful challenges to term of year sentences will be exceedingly rare, 538 U.S. at 14, and in
Harmelin, Justices O'Connor and Souter joined with and agreed with that conclusion, which was
expressed in the concurrence of Justice Kennedy, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Two
justices, however, went further in both cases, holding that proportionality review is so inherently
subjective that it should never be conducted. In Ewing, Justices Scalia and Thomas were of that
opinion. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
And, in Harmelin, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia were of that opinion. Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 961 (Scalia, J., concurring).
268. Though that majority disagrees as to why the sentences should not be thrown out, their
opinions nonetheless form a consensus of five justices that are unlikely to throw out sentences: three
because of reluctance, two because of opposition to throwing out such sentences. See supra note
263.
269. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text for a more thorough exploration of this point.
270. See supra notes 262-68 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 262-64, 266-68 and accompanying text.
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both of these issues, their opinions represent the current state of the law. 72
The import of Ewing on sentencing law should also be clear from the
cases discussed above.2 73  All of the cases acknowledged that a gross
disproportionality principle existed, and only two, both state court cases,
actually applied it.274 One of the two, Arizona, seemed to only apply the
gross disproportionality principle because of the unique nature of the
triggering offense: statutory rape.275 The victim had consented to the act,
and the court found this to be an objective factor that could be considered
under Justice Kennedy's Harmelin framework.276 The other state, Delaware,
applied the gross disproportionality principle because all of the recidivist's
offenses in that case had been non-violent, despite the Ewing Court's
implicit rejection of any requirement of violence.277 But because not a single
federal court mentioned above was able to find the petitioner's sentence
grossly disproportionate, and because the two state cases seem out of step
with the other state decisions mentioned above, Davis and Crosby seem to
be more of anomalies rather than glosses on Ewing.278 Thus, while a
defendant may have some remote hope of having his or her sentence found
unconstitutional, the rule of the day is judicial reluctance, striking down
legislative judgments only in the "extraordinary" case.
B. Three Strikes Laws
The Court in Ewing continued to recognize the constitutionality of three
strikes laws.279 It cited multiple precedents holding that enhanced sentences
due to previous convictions are not cruel and unusual punishment.280 It also
acknowledged, however, that no punishment is per se constitutional, and
thus all punishments are subject to proportionality review.2 8' In upholding
272. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 216-61 and accompanying text.
274. See id.
275. See supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
276. See id.
277. See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 243-61 and accompanying text.
279. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25-26 (2003).
280. Id. at 25 ("Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased
punishment.") (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998); Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995)).
281. Although Ewing did not explicitly make this holding, it did not call it into question either.
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14-31. Further, by applying Justice Kennedy's gross disproportionality
principles from Harmelin as the current state of the law, id. at 20, it implicitly embraced his holding
there that no punishment is per se constitutional. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the validity of proportionality review, the Court left open the possibility that
some three strikes sentences might be considered cruel and unusual
punishment.282 For example, the Court cited with approval an example
given by Rummel - the example being that a life sentence for overtime
283parking would be thrown out by proportionality review. Should a
legislature give three strikes sentences for similarly trivial offenses, it could
well expect to have those sentences thrown out. A majority of the Court,
though, found no proportionality problems with California's Three Strikes
law.2 4 Justice O'Connor found its legislative justifications to be reasonable
and constitutionally permissible.28 5 Thus, three strikes laws can continue to
impose the same sort of penalties as California's law but must be careful in
exceeding them.286
C. Societal Impact
The societal impact of Ewing is significant. By confining the gross
disproportionality principle to only "extraordinary" cases and giving
deference to state legislatures, the Court allowed a popular sentencing
scheme for recidivist offenders - the three strikes law - to continue to do its
work.287 And numerous statistics show that three strikes laws are in fact
working. 288 Currently, twenty-six states have three strikes laws.289 A review
of the results of two of these laws, California's and Washington State's, is
illustrative of their crime-reducing effects.
1. California
California's Three Strikes law, as mentioned above, was enacted by
California voters in 1994.290 Alarmed and angered at the many crimes
committed by recidivists, Californians wanted to lock them up for good.29'
Whether such a desire was motivated by "populist" or "anti-offender
sentiments" as the law's detractors allege,292 or by an honest belief that the
Three Strikes law would incapacitate and deter crime, the law has worked.
Numerous statistics show evidence of decline in criminal activity.293
282. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20-21.
283. Id.
284. See id. at 24-28. Since the least serious offenses are typically considered "wobblers" in
California, see id. at 48-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and the Court found the "wobbler" status of
Ewing's offense to be of no moment to its seriousness, id. at 28-29, the Court arguably found all the
sentences imposed by California's three strikes law to be constitutional.
285. See id. at 24-28.
286. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 279-86 and accompanying text.
288. Janiskee & Eler, supra note 6, at 45-46.
289. Connie Skipitares, Three Strikes Law Appears to Have Met Goal, MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 2,
2002, at Al.
290. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15.
291. Id.
292. Janiskee & Erler, supra note 6, at 54-55. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
293. Janiskee & Erler, supra note 6, at 52-54.
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For example, "the pre-Three Strikes rate of decline for 1992-1993 in the
Total Crime Index was 2.35 percent," but after the passage of the Three
Strikes law, from 1995-1998, the rate of decline in the same index was 8.39
percent. 294 Also, in the same pre-Three Strikes period, the rate of decline in
the Violent Crime Index was .5 percent, while in the same post-Three
Strikes period, the rate of decline in the Violent Crime Index was 8.66
percent.295 Further, the homicide rate in those same periods before and after
the Three Strikes law shows a dramatic change.296  From 1992-1993, it
increased 1.57 percent, but from 1995-1998, it decreased 13.36 percent. 297
In fact, a RAND Corporation study estimated that the Three Strikes law
reduced serious felonies to between 22 and 34 percent below the level of
crime that would have occurred had the law not been enacted.298
Also, anecdotal evidence shows that the law has a deterrent effect on
repeat criminals who have not yet received their third strike.299 Two-strike
parolee Gregory Gaines claimed that as a result of the Three Strikes law,
he's "flipped 100 percent. ' ' 300 He stated that the law has scared him into
being a "brand new [him]," and that it will keep him working hard and keep
his attitude adjusted.3 °' Sacramento police officer Lieutenant Joe Enroe is
convinced of the law's deterrent effect.30 2 According to Enroe, "You hear
them [the criminals] talking about [the Three Strikes law] all the time. It's
swift and sure, not like the death penalty. These guys are really squirming.
They know what's going on."30 3
Prosecutors also claim that the law is working.3 4 Stanislaus County
District Attorney Don Staahl claimed, "The people we're getting are heavy
hitters. The current offense may not be serious, but they have a criminal
history that really spells danger. We're saving a lot of risk for the future,
and we're making them pay for their past. That's what 'three strikes' is all
294. Id. at 52.
295. Id. at 53.
296. Id.
297. Id. Janiskee and Erler cite these and the above statistics, not as evidence of a mere steady
decline, but rather of a "precipitous and dramatic decline." Id. at 54.
298. Dan Lungren, Three Cheers for Three Strikes: California Enjoys a Record Drop in Crime, 80
POL'Y REv. 36 (1996).
299. See Janiskee & Erler, supra note 6, at 45; Andy Furillo, 'Three Strikes' Hinges on Issue of
Deterrence, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al.
300. Furillo, supra note 299, at Al.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See Andy Furillo, Most Offenders Have Long Criminal Histories, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar.
31, 1996, at Al.
about., 30 5 Agreeing, Ventura County Deputy District Attorney Don Janes
stated, "We're getting some very bad people, and instead of them doing life
on the installment plan, they're just going away., 30 6 Statistics validate
prosecutorial observations: Eighty-four percent of three-strikers in a survey
conducted by the Sacramento Bee had been convicted at least once for a
violent crime.30 7
Stories of offenders sent away by the Three Strikes law also confirm its
value to many. One such criminal, Arthur Gonzalez, bit into his girlfriend's
face when she took too much time getting him some methamphetamine.3 °8
Another, Herbert Mahaffey, who complained at his sentencing that children
have "no respect toward adults," was convicted of fourteen counts of rape
and attempted rape of his fourteen-year-old daughter.309 A third, Leonard
Henderson, broke into the home of an eighty-two-year-old woman; slugged
her in the face, opening a gash that required twenty-two stitches to shut; and
then raped her.3 10 Henderson had been on parole for six months.3 1 His
previous offense was sexually assaulting a woman during a burglary.31 2
In perhaps the strongest indicator of Three Strikes' deterrent effect,
criminals voted with their feet; after the passage of the law, California went
from being a net importer of felons to being a net exporter.31 3 According to
former California Attorney General Dan Lungren, in the last year before
Three Strikes took effect, 1994, 226 more paroled felons chose to move to
California than move away from it. 3 14 After the law took effect, in 1995,
1,335 more paroled felons chose to move away from California than move to
it.315 Thus, by incapacitating those individuals who have repeatedly shown
their willingness to break the law, and by deterring others, the Three Strikes
law appears to have reduced serious and violent crime.
2. Washington State
Washington State passed the first three strikes law in the country,
Initiative 593, in November 1993.316 Initiative 593 was passed by a three-to-
one margin, largely for the same reason as California's Proposition 184:
Voters were fed up with violent crime.317 Unlike California's broad strike-
triggering category, encompassing all felonies, Washington chose to list
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See Lungren, supra note 298, at 36.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Richard Seven, Three Strikes Law Casting Wide Net, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at Al.
317. Id.; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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strike-triggering offenses.318 In Washington, almost fifty separate felonies
are considered strikes, ranging from vehicular assault to aggravated
murder.31 9 Although Washington has not seen quite the dramatic reduction
in crime that California has, three strikes sentences seem to be at work
reducing crime there as well.32°
Numerous statistics show reduction in criminal activity following the
passage of the Three Strikes law. 321 The violent crime rate has steadily
dropped since the law was passed. From 1993 to 1995, violent crime
plummeted 8.1 percent;3 22 in 1996, violent crime dropped 9.5 percent; 323 and
in 1998 and 1999, violent crime fell 7.1 percent.324 The results for property
crime, however, have been more mixed. Property crime increased by 4.4
percent from 1993 to 1995,325 but in the next year fell by 2.7 percent.326
Anecdotal evidence also indicates that the Three Strikes law has been a
success.327 Police and corrections officers have observed criminals
modifying their behavior, acting out of fear of the law.328 In the immediate
aftermath of the law's passage, a Seattle Police Detective, Bob Shilling, met
with three sex offenders, each of whom already had two strikes.329 Two of
the offenders were interested in treatment for the first time in their lives and
sought the detective's help in finding a program. 33° Both offenders stated
that they were seeking treatment out of fear of receiving a life-without-
parole sentence under the Three Strikes law.
331
Yakima County Prosecutor Jeff Sullivan has also noted the importance
of the law: "The police tell me, and I believe them, that 10 percent of the
criminals commit 80 percent of the crimes.... When they get [their third
318. Seven, supra note 316, at Al.
319. Id.
320. See infra notes 317-36 and accompanying text.
321. Three Strikes You're Out: A Reform that Worked, WASH. POL'Y CTR. (1997) at
http://www.washingtonpolicycenter.org/CriminalJustice/PN3StrikesReformThatWorked97-03.htm]
[hereinafter "WPC"].
322. Id. (noting that percentage was adjusted based on Washington's population growth).
323. State's Crime Rate Falls, SEATrLE TIMES, June 14, 1997, at A5 [hereinafter "Crime Rate
Falls"].
324. Nicole Brodeur, Crime Numbers Reassuring, Unless It's Your Number That's Up, SEATrLE
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at B1.
325. WPC, supra note 321 (noting that percentage was adjusted based on Washington's
population growth).
326. Crime Rate Falls, supra note 323, at A5.
327. WPC, supra note 321.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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strike], they've earned their way to prison. 332
Stories of offenders sent away by Washington's three strikes law also
confirm its value.333 One criminal, a sexual psychopath named Johnny
Eggers, murdered a seventeen-year-old girl.334 Another, Kris Howe, killed
an eighty-nine-year-old woman who had hired him to do yard work.335 And
a third, David Conyers, robbed six convenience stores in forty-eight hours in
a concerted effort to stay high on crack.336 Conyers had only been out of
prison three days, and at age twenty, is Washington's youngest three-
striker.337
Lastly, although Washington still imports more criminals than it exports,
the passage of the Three Strikes law has led to a decrease in the number of
criminals coming to Washington.338 A Seattle television station recently
investigated the impact of the law on out-of-state criminals.339 It noted that
many criminals were requesting information on the law, and many, upon
receiving the information, changed their minds and chose not to come. 340
Thus, although Washington has not witnessed quite the stunning success
California has, it has seen a steady and encouraging decline in criminal
activity following the passage of its three strikes law.
3. Conclusions
As prime promoter of Washington's three strikes law, John Carlson
noted, "The leading cause of crime in this country is letting criminals out of
prison. '" 34 The Court in Ewing wisely chose to allow states to keep their
criminals locked up.342 As a result, states can continue to use three strikes
laws to combat crime, resulting in continued deterrence and incapacitation.
Such a large societal impact is clearly significant.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Ewing upheld California's Three Strikes law
and lends support to other states hoping to enact similar laws. Legislatures
will be able to continue incapacitating repeat felons through life sentences.343
Also, giving some hope to opponents of three strikes laws, the Court upheld
332. Seven, supra note 316, at Al.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. WPC, supra note 321.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Tom Brown, Theories Abound on Drop in Crime - Better Police Work, Tougher Laws Cited,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 5, 1997, at Al.
342. See supra notes 279-86 and accompanying text.
343. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25-26 (2003) (holding that incapacitation is a legitimate
penological goal).
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the constitutionality of proportionality review. 344 Sentences must still pass
constitutional muster, and it is possible that the Court might find some future
three strikes law grossly disproportionate.345 A majority of the current
Court, however, is reluctant to engage in proportionality review,346 and thus
it is likely that laws like California's will be on the books incapacitating
felons for some time to come.
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